Introduction
In Spring of 2007, Syed Fahad Hashmi was extradited to the United States and immediately placed in solitary confinement. 1 Hashmi had been arrested in the United Kingdom nearly a year prior to his extradition, and accused of involvement in terrorism. 2 The conditions of his confinement in the United States were not limited simply to normal solitary confinementthree months after his extradition he was placed under Special Administrative Measures [SAMs] 3 whereby his visits from his family and attorneys (the only visits he was permitted) were pretrial solitary confinement in terrorism cases. 15 Other SAMs cases offer further clues that
SAMs are being applied unthinkingly and without oversight, such as the imposition of SAMs on one defendant whose judge determined outright that he posed no immediate danger, 16 or the statement by a prosecutor, when SAMs were questioned, that SAMs were, to his understanding "the way all material support defendants were held," regardless of the specific allegations against those defendants. criminal justice practices than to early 21 st century responses to terrorism, and I suggest that this may be true for many other supposed "changes" in response to the terror attacks of 2001.
Researching SAMs
As with many aspects of the response to terrorism in the 21 st century, analysis of SAMs policy is fraught with difficulty because of its hidden nature. The practice of SAMs has been shrouded in secrecy, making it very difficult to know precisely how the practice works or has worked over time. assume that their actions give some insight to what they believe will work in the criminal justice system. In other words, prosecutors put forward that information that they believe will be deemed sufficient to achieve the result they want, i.e. the imposition of SAMs, while defense attorneys put forward those arguments which they believe will give their clients the best chance of removal from SAMs, and judges' formal opinions give the amount of information they believe necessary in order to make their decision legitimate in the eyes of observers, most importantly higher level (appellate) judges. These arguments and opinions, then, give insight into the way in which participants in the criminal justice system perceive the requirements, norms, and values of that system. Perhaps more importantly, in the case of the criminal justice system, these arguments constitute the system itself, as the acceptance of norms and priorities, represented in judicial opinions, becomes precedent and therefore law in future cases. The answer is, no. As the following sections will show, SAMs must be examined in light of the transition to a punitive and yet administrative, preventive, risk-averse, and therefore deferential criminal justice system. SAMs belong in this late modern criminal justice system, both historically and ideologically. This suggests that we may find criminal justice roots for other aspects of the response to terrorism in the 21 st Century.
The following sections describe the development of SAMs.
The Birth of SAMs
Although it appears to have been generally forgotten, 50 While this led to substantial criticism, the option to monitor attorney-client conversations does not appear to have ever been used. 77 Several additional, but perhaps less notable modifications were included as well. The regulation was amended to allow for an initial detention of up to one year before the dangerousness of a prisoner had to be reevaluated. 78 Certainly, it is possible that this had a substantive effect on inmates held under SAMs, however in practice it appears unlikely. Wadih
El-Hage, for instance, who was held prior to the modification, received a modification to his 2008 . This was based on an analysis of the legislative intent behind the Prison Litigation Reform Act , 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a) (from which the exhaustion requirement stems), which they found to be one of lessening the financial burden on courts. The relatively inexpensive nature of a new motion in an already existing action, as opposed to the creation of an entirely new case and claim, led these courts to the conclusion that the exhaustion requirement did not apply. . 89 According to Reiter, the creation and preservation of ADMAX facilities may be directly linked to federal prisoners' rights litigation in these decades. As courts specified necessary protections for prisoners, prison administrators responded by addressing the letter, rather than spirit of these requirements. Administrators responded to courts' admonishments regarding prison conditions by building new, pristine, technologically advanced cells that could not be 89 Reiter, supra note 12; Haney, supra note 10.
criticized in this manner. Advancing technologies allowed prison administrators to address the need for out of cell time, medical intervention, and similar tangible needs without increasing actual human contact, or in fact while decreasing that contact. By the time prisoners' litigation could respond to these developments, the rehabilitative ideal had disappeared from prisons, replaced by a steadily increasing willingness of judges to defer to the administrative determinations of prison officials, particularly regarding prison safety. 90 Moreover, prison administrators were able to respond to challenges that they were abiding by every letter of courts' prior rulings, 91 and that their own grievance procedures (a form of "cosmetic compliance" with former rights-protective court rulings) should be relied on in order to rectify any remaining problems 92 .
Haney turns directly to the abandonment of the rehabilitative ideal, and the advancing tendency to view crime and criminals as a problem to be managed rather than resolved. This general criminal justice trend was compounded due to the steadily increasing prison population, which caused massive overcrowding, in turn causing disciplinary complications. ADMAX facilities enabled the management of this increasing population, arguably unnecessarily, while providing some level of ammunition to politicians looking to court voters by appearing "tough on crime." (Haney, 2003) In other words, ADMAX may be seen as an outgrowth of the deferential posture accorded to criminal justice officials by the judiciary, originating in a public-safety oriented criminal justice system and political body that had turned away from prisoners' rights in favor of 90 Reiter, supra note 12.; Van Swearingen, supra note 12. 91 Reiter, supra note 12. 92 Swearingen, supra note 12.
26 prevention and management of criminal activity. In the case of ADMAX, this originated with the public safety rhetoric of the 1980s, and "flourished" in the 1990s. 93 By 1991, when Gotti lodged his successful challenge to his ADMAX housing, the ADMAX boom was well underway.
"Super maximum security" prison facilities existed or were being built in more than half the states in the country. 94 Courts were steadily accepting these facilities, due to the meticulousness of their creation and the generally increasing deference that judges were willing to accord prison administrators.
In this context, the creation and acceptance of SAMs hardly seems surprising. Yet SAMs still may be seen as a step further than ADMAX, at least when imposed prior to trial. The following section discusses the evolution of pretrial SAMs, from a rarely imposed and carefully overseen exception, to the reflexive practice which it is today.
SAMS: From rare to reflexive
Scholars looking at SAMs typically date their origin at 1996, 95 when the phrase "special administrative measures" was first used in a BOP regulation. 110 Referring to "reams of exhibits." Id. 111 Id., at 80. information, no mention of the 1995 SAMs regulation regarding classified (rather than significant) information, and no suggestion that the information El Hage had was classified, the Second Circuit upheld El Hage's SAMs on the basis of his capabilities alone.
112 Acknowledging the contrast between this case and Felipe, namely that in this case there was no evidence of the inmate ever having engaged in dangerous communications, the Second Circuit maintained that El-Hage was dangerous because of what "information he might communicate to others." 113 One year prior to the 9/11 attacks, SAMs had already taken a wild leap forward in terms of earlier intervention and preventive action. Evidence that harm was likely was apparently no longer necessary, the possibility of harm would be sufficient to impose SAMs.
As El Hage moved SAMs practice forward in terms of increasingly early interventions, the case of Yousef v. Reno 114 significantly changed the level of judicial oversight of SAMs. It is surprising that the Yousef case so moved SAMs doctrine; Yousef was held under SAMs after his conviction, so there was no question as to whether he was a terrorist or had terrorist associates.
As to the risk that Yousef posed from jail, a jailhouse informant had told prosecutors that Yousef was plotting criminal acts from jail, even turning over to prosecutors handwritten notes containing evidence of Yousef's schemes. 115 There is little doubt that Yousef's SAMs would have been upheld by any judge overseeing the case, had any judge truly overseen case. This was based on an analysis of the legislative intent behind the Prison Litigation Reform Act , 42 U.S.C. §1997e(a) (from which the exhaustion requirement stems), which they found to be one of lessening the financial burden on courts. The relatively inexpensive nature of a new motion in an already existing action, as opposed to the creation of an entirely new case and claim, led these courts to the conclusion that the exhaustion requirement did not apply.
In these ways, judges allowed SAMs practice to become increasingly preventive in the years preceding 2001; first by requiring less proximity to criminal activity prior to allowing detention, and second by ceding oversight of SAMs to the executive branch. Even as the SAMs regulations abandoned the requirement of hearings for extended confinement, and in the face of BOP admission that no due process could be obtained through administrative review, the judicial branch abandoned its oversight of the executive branch. This gave the executive branch unchecked authority to detain defendants, pretrial (let alone pre-conviction), in solitary confinement, in cases that would often go on for years before reaching trail.
The examples of Syed Hashmi and Mohamed Warsame are telling. Warsame's detention, which was spent entirely under SAMs, was claimed by his lawyers to have been the longest in U.S. history. 119 Warsame was known to have terrorist connections, to have trained at a terrorist training camp, and to have been communicating with terrorists prior to his arrest. 120 However, the judge on Warsame's case seemed unconvinced of his dangerousness, at one point making a specific finding that SAMs were unnecessary. 121 Even at sentencing, the judge remained unconvinced of Warsame's dangerousness. 122 Yet in spite of both this hesitancy and the judge's order, Warsame's SAMs were never removed.
As was mentioned above, the government's evidence of dangerousness in the case of Syed Hashmi seems similarly weak. Outside of the support he had provided to a high ranking member of a terrorist group, the concern regarding Hashmi appeared to center around the individuals he was associated with. The government alleged that Hashmi had served as a gobetween for two terrorists who had been involved with a terror conspiracy in the United Kingdom, however it did not allege that Hashmi himself had any knowledge of how to build bombs or engage in any other violent acts, or that he could direct (or even ask) these other terrorists to engage in violence on his behalf. To the contrary, the government informant in the case had stated that topics of importance were avoided in front of Hashmi, because he was an outsider, not a member of al Qaeda, and rather a member of a public, political group that was not involved in violence. 123 A claim that Hashmi had made threats that terrorists would avenge his being held in prison was dropped prior to a 2008 motion to renew Hashmi's SAMs. 124 Yet
Hashmi was held under SAMs for three years prior to his agreement to plead guilty, and has been so confined since that plea. we've got to keep data away from him, we've got to keep his data out of the hands of the public lest disaster befall, respectfully, is wearing a bit thin." 126 He further expressed his concern that the government was going to spirit Reid off to Guantanamo, a concern which had resulted in an order that Reid not be moved without the prior permission of the court, 127 and he maintained that
Reid's attorneys would not be forced to sign the affirmation generally required in SAMs cases, noting the ongoing prosecution of Lynne Stewart. 128 In fact, upon first seeing the SAMs this judge had ordered the SAMs lifted, 129 reasoning that "the SAMs did not apply to Reid, as he was a pre-trial (sic) detainee presumed to be innocent." thereof. This lack is discussed in the next section.
Birckhead. 136 Sam Schmidt and Joshua Dratel further suggest that the district court's refusal to grant a severance in the case was in part based on sympathy for "the significant negative impact of the S.A.M.'s on the defendants and their ability to prepare and contribute to their defense." Schmidt Once again, the Yousef case stands as a seeming death knell for SAMs argument. Yousef had clearly raised an argument regarding the effect solitary confinement had on his well-beinghis Eighth Amendment claims could be based on little else. 137 But with the dismissal of Yousef's claim not only judges but defense attorneys seem to have abandoned the argument that pretrial solitary confinement could be overseen on the basis of the effect it has on defendants.
Following this case, the argument that the solitary confinement included as an aspect of SAMs was either punitive or simply cruel disappeared from the majority of cases. 138 Where it was brought -most often in pro se motions by convicted inmates at the Supermax facility in
Florence, Colorado --it was quickly dismissed or abandoned. defendant. 148 In other words, the government was quite well aware of the lack of oversight of SAMs and preventive detention in Article III courts, and proceeded to demand that lack of oversight in Guantanamo.
Indeed, the entire phenomenon of Guantanamo may be explained as a government effort to claim the right to determine who needs to be punished, without the meddling interference of judges or juries. In creating Guantanamo, as many authors have noticed, the government endeavored to create the opportunity to act entirely without judicial oversight. 149 Guantanamo would allow the government to bypass frustrating limitations on the length of detention, historically created to ensure a jury or judge would check government allegations and force accusers to bring some proof of a reason to hold detainees. 150 In other words, with Guantanamo, with black sites, and with drone strikes, the government found a way to avoid being caught up in any argument over the guilt or innocence of detainees.
While black sites, drone strikes, and the use of indefinite detention at Guantanamo are extreme measures, the lack of oversight they display are not so far from the use of "short cuts"
and "end-runs" around judicial oversight seen in late 20 th century criminal justice alternatives.
Yet SAMs may be an example of a "missing link" in comparisons between U.S. counterterror policies and U.S. criminal justice. Through SAMs, the connection between accepted criminal justice practices and the application of those practices to the pursuit of terror suspects can be seen. Rather than relying on vague accusations that the U.S. criminal justice system was already "harsh," "preventive," or "unilateral," the development of SAMs shows just how the decrease in 148 See also statement of prosecutor in U.S. 
